The Middle East faces a profound reshaping from the ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran,yet several fundamental realities will likely endure beyond the fighting. While major wars often leave deep transformations, history shows the region's exceptional ability to absorb shocks without altering its underlying essence.
Experts frequently predict a new regional order emerging from the conflict. But a critical question remains: what aspects of the Middle East will not change,regardless of military outcomes?
Strategic geography, a constant since human civilization began in the region,will persist. Strait of Hormuz will continue to control nearly one-fifth of global oil passage. The Suez Canal remains a vital artery for international trade, and the Fertile Crescent still links Asia to Europe. Iran will overlook the Strait of Hormuz,Yemen will guard the Bab al-Mandeb waterway, and Egypt will maintain control of the Suez Canal . War may shift governance,but not these geographical imperatives or struggle for their control.
The Palestinian issue also stands as an enduring reality . It existed long before the Islamic Republic of Iran and will remain central concern, irrespective of Iran's fate. The Abraham Accords of 2020 were premised on the belief that a shared threat from Iran could marginalize the Palestinian question. current conflict, however, has exposed the fragility of this assumption.
Indeed, Iran has leveraged the situation, portraying itself as a victim of US-Israel aggression. This narrative has helped it regain some Arab public sympathy,which had diminished due to its interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. Across the Arab world,public opinion, including younger generations in states with official peace with Israel,remains deeply attached to the Palestinian cause. Any future regional order that fails to address this issue will inherently carry seeds of instability.
Sectarian divisions, though deepened by the war in countries like Iraq, Lebanon,and Yemen,did not originate with the Iranian Revolution. They will not disappear with Iran's defeat. While the conflict might alter the balance of power among sectarian groups or weaken Iran's ability to exploit these divisions,it will not erase sectarian identities. Shia communities in Bahrain,Iraq,Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia possess their own grievances and social realities,independent of Tehran,which will continue to shape their political landscapes .
The structural crisis of the modern Arab state also predates the current hostilities and will persist. Countries with weak political institutions, ineffective judicial systems,bloated security apparatuses, and unproductive rentier economies were fragile before the war. They will remain so after it. The conflict risks deepening this fragility by diverting governments towards security confrontations and temporary alliances,postponing crucial political and economic reforms needed by ordinary citizens.
Confidence in the United States model in the region had already eroded before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Arab public, even in allied nations, views US policy with resentment and sometimes contempt. The war may restore some US prestige among governments fearing Iranian dominance. But it will not restore broad Arab public confidence in the US vision for the Middle East . Military dominance alone has proven insufficient for building political legitimacy or trust,a lesson the United States learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Political Islam,too,will survive beyond Iran's immediate sphere of influence. While war has dealt a blow to the Iranian-aligned current and fragmented the "axis of resistance," political Islamist movements are diverse and complex. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood,activist Salafist movements,and various nationalist Islamic currents emerge from local social contexts and grievances unrelated to Tehran. For millions in region, Islam serves as a reference point for politics and resistance . This will not vanish with destruction of facilities like the Fordow nuclear site. Any vacuum created by the collapse of one axis will likely be filled by competition among alternative Islamic references,not by liberal secular age .
