BRIC Team reports: The recent developments within the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), appear to have dealt a decisive blow to its representation in the Rajya Sabha. On April 24, 2026, seven out of its 10 sitting Members of Parliament, publicly announced that over two-thirds of the party’s MPs had decided to merge with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), invoking the provisions of the 10th Schedule of the Constitution.While the development has attracted widespread political attention, its implications extend beyond immediate partisan concerns. It raises significant constitutional questions regarding the interpretation of the anti-defection law, particularly the scope of the “merger” exception under the 10th Schedule.
Nor is the episode entirely unprecedented. Similar assertions of legislative strength have been witnessed at the State level, most notably in the case of the Eknath Shinde-led faction in the Shiv Sena within the Maharashtra Assembly. However, the present instance assumes greater significance as it unfolds at the national level, involving MPs in the Rajya Sabha, thereby amplifying its constitutional and political consequences.Also Read | Meant to protect free speech from anti-defection law, ‘merger’ is now a defence for joining a rival party Anti-defection framework, ‘split’ doctrineThe Constitution, as originally adopted in 1950, provided for disqualification of MPs on limited grounds under Article 103, to be decided by the President of India acting on the opinion of the Election Commission of India.
Background
The 10th Schedule, introduced by the 52nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1985, expanded this framework to address the persistent problem of political defections adding another ground for disqualification of members to be decided by the Speaker or Chairman. The objective was to curb the practice of elected representatives abandoning their parties for political gain, by attaching the consequence of disqualification.At the same time, the Schedule originally carved out two exceptions, “split” under Paragraph 3 and “merger” under Paragraph 4. The first, which recognised a split in a legislature party where one-third of its members formed a separate faction, was subsequently deleted by the 91st Constitution Amendment Act, 2003, following recommendations of Electoral Reforms (Dinesh Goswami Committee) in May 1990 and the 170th Law Commission Report, 1999.
Key facts
- The recent developments within the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), appear to have dealt a decisive blow to its representation in the Rajya Sabha.
- It raises significant constitutional questions regarding the interpretation of the anti-defection law, particularly the scope of the “merger” exception under the 10th Schedule.
- Nor is the episode entirely unprecedented.
What this means
This deletion marked a conscious shift away from recognising internal fractures within legislature parties as a legitimate defence to defection.The omission of Paragraph 3 carries deeper implications. The concept of “split” had implicitly recognised a degree of autonomy in the legislature party vis-à-vis the political party. Its removal signals Parliament’s clear intent to restore primacy to the political party as the central unit of democratic accountability.The Supreme Court of India has also reinforced this position in Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), where a Constitution Bench declined to interpret the 10th Schedule in a manner that severs the figurative umbilical cord between a legislature party and its parent political party.
The Court underscored that the political party continues to guide and control the actions of its elected members, even after electoral victory.Watch | AAP loses 7 Rajya Sabha MPs in one blow, what now? | The Hindu ExplainsThe merger exception in questionThe present controversy centres on the interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the 10th Schedule, which provides immunity from disqualification in cases of merger. The key question is whether such a merger can be effected solely by two-thirds of the members of a legislature party, or whether it must necessarily be preceded by, or reflect, a decision of the original political party itself.A plain reading of Paragraph 4 suggests that the exemption applies where the “original political party” merges with another political party.
